PhilPeople Profile 

 Lying, hedging, and the norms of assertion

I argue that a speaker can lie while hedging her assertion with a first-person epistemic verb phrase in parenthetical position, such as "It's raining outside, I think." I then argue that this data cannot be accommodated by a recent theory that defines lying in terms of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. 


A paper about sociolinguistic variation, in which I argue that variation functions to empower communities of speakers with common interests to differentiate themselves from out-group speakers.

A paper about linguistic reform, efforts to implement changes to the conventional meanings of linguistic expressions.

A paper about virtuous speech, in which I argue that speech act theory should take a virtue-theoretic approach rather than the traditional norm-theoretic approach, drawing comparisons with virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. 

A paper about lying, in which I characterize a new methodology for theories of lying that has recently appeared in the literature, and argue that we should prefer this approach over the traditional methodology of conceptual analysis.

A paper about counterfactual conditionals and their semantics and pragmatics.

A paper about salience as a concept in semantic theory.

My tortoiseshell cat Cosmo